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Abstract 
Eighteenth-century naval ships were impressive infrastructures, but subjected to extraordinary strain. To 
assist with their ‘voyage repairs’, the Royal Navy gradually established numerous overseas bases, displaying 
the power, reach, and ruthless logistical efficiency of the British state. This article, however, is concerned 
with what happened where no such bases (yet) existed, in parts of the world falling in between areas of direct 
British administration, control, or influence. The specific restrictions imposed by technology and 
infrastructures have been studied by historians interested in naval strategy, but they can also help to reframe 
national narratives of power, or observe the transnational interactions surrounding access to knowledge and 
resources. This paper discusses the material, cultural and diplomatic constraints that could appear when 
vessels, and especially ‘discovery ships’, sailed in strange waters or sought technical assistance in allied 
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ports. I argue that the ‘mortification’ of some commanders at their vessels’ unfitness for service was an 
important – and often neglected – element on the palette of emotions undergone by voyagers, capturing their 
strong sense of ultimate material powerlessness. Such frustration even became embedded in imperial 
cartography, as shown by the case study of Matthew Flinders. This perspective highlights the limits of naval 
technology, complicating imperialistic ‘success stories’, and better reintegrating the Navy into the history of 
maritime travel and transportation, from which it is often singled out.  
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In August 2018, to commemorate the 250th anniversary of James Cook’s first Pacific 
voyage, the British Royal Mail released a set of ten special stamps, remembering the achievements 
of the expedition. Next to charts, expedition members, navigational instruments, scientific 
discoveries, a Tahitian mourner, and a Maori chief, the collection includes one stamp which shows 
Cook’s vessel careened with makeshift arrangements in Waalumbaal Birri, in the summer of 1770, 
after it had struck a coral reef: ‘Disaster avoided: repairs on the Endeavour River’, reads the caption 
[Figure 1].1 The image comes from an engraving which appeared as a plate in the earliest published 
accounts of the journey [Figure 2].2 Other contemporary versions exist, conveying the same 
impression of activity and technological mastery in a wild and rugged landscape: ship stores are 
 
1 “Captain Cook and Endeavour,” Collect GB Stamps, 2018 
<https://www.collectgbstamps.co.uk/explore/issues/?issue=22788>. For Cook’s own account of the episode see: J. C. 
Beaglehole, The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyage of Discovery: The Voyage of the Endeavour, 1768-
1771 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp.343-69. The scholarship on the stop at ‘Endeavour River’ has 
mainly explored the resulting complex encounter with Indigenous people. See e.g.: Stuart Murray, “‘Notwithstanding 
Our Signs to the Contrary’: Textuality and Authority at the Endeavour River, June to August 1771,” in Glyndwr 
Williams (ed.), Captain Cook: Explorations and Reassessments (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), pp.59-76. 
2 John Hawkesworth, An Account of the Voyages Undertaken by the Order of His Present Majesty for Making 
Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere…, 3 vols (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1773), III, Plate 19, by William 
Byrne], ante p.557. And see Figure 2. 
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arranged all over the beach, tents and even a cabin have been erected from scratch, and some men 
carefully assess the leak under the hulk of the beached vessel [Figure 3]. The ingenuity and 
resourcefulness of British navigators, allowing competent ship repairs even in remote corners of the 
world, have always been part and parcel of the narrative of successful and self-sufficient imperial 
expansion and ‘discovery’. However, by turning what often amounted to material defeat into a tale 
of technological triumph, there is much that this kind of interpretation leaves out. 
 
 
Figure 1: “Disaster avoided: repairs on the Endeavour River”. © Stamp Design Royal Mail Group 









Figure 2: “View of Endeavour River, on the Coast of New Holland, where Captain Cook had the 
Ship laid on Shore (…).” Image cropped from: George William Anderson, A New, Authentic, and 
Complete Collection of Voyages round the World, Undertaken and Performed by Royal Authority 
(London: A. Hogg, 1800), plate ante p.65. Available as part of the Wellcome Collection, under 
Public Domain Mark: <https://wellcomecollection.org/works/mcsjmyz8>. 
 
 
Figure 3: “Repairing of Capt. Cook's Ship in Endeavour River (Cook’s First Voyage)” (etching, 





Keeping naval ships operational abroad required an immense effort. Crews had to be 
supplied for and taken care of in remote localities. This was the task of the Sick and Hurt Board, 
which built hospitals, and of the Victualling Board, Navy Board, and Transport Board: corruption, 
efficiency and inefficiencies within these bodies have been the object of recent historiographical 
debates.3 Seamen themselves often had to be recruited overseas if too many of them had died or 
deserted en route.4 However, the most fundamental human, material, and technological problem 
inherent to the relocation of naval power was tending to the vessels themselves, repairing them, and 
keeping them afloat in different conditions. 
Eighteenth-century wooden vessels needed regular maintenance and replacement of rotten 
parts.5 In many ways, they were more self-sufficient than modern fuel-powered ships, relying on a 
constant (if whimsical and fluctuating) source of propulsion, rather than an exhaustible one.6  
However, intrinsic to their way of travelling were repeated stops for ‘voyage repairs’, which, unlike 
today’s ‘unscheduled ship maintenance’, were more or less an expected feature of long voyages.7 
The historiography has explored the main solution adopted by the eighteenth-century British 
Admiralty: the creation of its own overseas bases and stations, supplementing the work of the Royal 
Dockyards in Britain.8 This was an impressive feat, displaying in full the power, reach, and ruthless 
 
3 Erica Charters, Disease, War, and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces during the Seven 
Years’ War (Chicago MI and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014); Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox, 
Sustaining the Fleet, 1793-1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 
2010); Janet Macdonald, The British Navy's Victualling Board, 1793–1815: Management Competence and 
Incompetence (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2010); James Davey, The Transformation of British Naval Strategy: 
Seapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808-1812 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012). 
4 Christian Buchet, “La Royal Navy et les levées d'hommes aux Antilles (1689-1763) : difficultés rencontrées et 
modalités évolutives,” Histoire, économie et société 9:4 (1990): 521-543; Sara Caputo, “Towards a Transnational 
History of the Eighteenth-Century British Navy,” Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française 397 (2019): 13-32. 
5 Jonathan G. Coad, The Royal Dockyards 1690-1850: Architecture and Engineering Works of the Sailing Navy 
(Aldershot and Brookfield VT: Scolar Press, 1989), p.305. 
6 Ibid. 
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to Ensure 
that Voyage Repairs are Available to Ships Operating Near Guam When Needed (12 May 2008) 
<https://www.gao.gov/products/A82096>.  
8 Coad, Royal Dockyards, pp.305-77; Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp.341-72; Duncan Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval 
Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993); Malcolm Lester, “Vice-
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logistical efficiency of the British fiscal-military state.9 Nonetheless, while British naval bases were 
scattered far and wide, by the end of the century ranging from the West Indies to the Mediterranean, 
South Africa, the Indian Ocean, and even Australia, significant spaces remained between them, 
representing weeks or months of sea travel time [see Figure 4]. Here we shall examine what 
happened to naval ‘discovery’ vessels in those parts of the world which fell in between areas of 
direct British administration, control, or influence.  
 
 
Figure 4: Eighteenth-century British naval bases. These were not all simultaneously under British 





Admiral George Murray and the Origins of the Bermuda Naval Base, 1794-96,” The Mariner’s Mirror 94:3 (2008): 
285-97. On the British dockyards see also: Roger Morriss, The Royal Dockyards during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983); Philip MacDougall, Royal Dockyards (Newton Abbot: 
David & Charles, 1982); Kenneth Lunn and Ann Day (eds.), History of Work and Labour Relations in the Royal 
Dockyards (London and New York: Mansell, 1999); J. M. Haas, A Management Odyssey: The Royal Dockyards, 1714-
1914 (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1994), pp.1-65. 
9 Jonathan Coad, “To Serve the Fleet in Distant Waters. Buildings of the Georgian Royal Navy’s Overseas Bases,” 
Transactions of the Naval Dockyards Society 5 (2009): 51-63, 62. 
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An extensive ‘internalist’ historiography, primarily focused on the technology itself rather 
than its context, has meticulously mapped the details and functioning of eighteenth-century naval 
vessels.10 A solid scholarly tradition has also examined the technological and administrative 
challenges of a naval ‘blue water’ policy, with ‘lines of communication’ stretching across the 
globe.11 However, these studies sought in naval history strategic and political lessons for sea power 
and warfare. My aim here is, instead, to show how the specific restrictions imposed by naval 
technology can also be of interest to the social or cultural historian – helping to observe 
transnational interactions and reframe narratives of national power. What follows, therefore, is 
partly aligned with Barton C. Hacker’s recent call for a ‘social history of military technology’, 
which, less vulnerable to scathing accusations of ‘antiquarianism’ or ‘utilitarianism’, can appeal 
even to historians who do not primarily study war itself.12 It also echoes John B. Hattendorf’s 
urging for ‘specialist’ sub-fields in maritime and naval history to overcome their traditional 
opposition, and explore the options which a joint effort offers.13 
The difficulty to complete voyage repairs occasionally obstructed military operations. It 
created situations in which the British fleet suddenly had to rely on external resources. It also 
affected the imperial scientific explorations sponsored by the Navy. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century ‘survey sciences’ faced unique problems because they intrinsically required mobility and 
 
10 A prominent journal in the field is The Mariner’s Mirror. See also, e.g.: Brian Lavery, The Ship of the Line – Volume 
I: The Development of the Battlefleet 1650-1850 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1983); Robert Gardiner, Frigates of 
the Napoleonic Wars (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000); John Harland, Seamanship in the Age of Sail: An Account 
of the Shiphandling of the Sailing Man-of-War 1600-1860, Based on Contemporary Sources (London: Conway, 1984). 
For my use of the term ‘internalist’ see: John M. Staudenmaier, “Recent Trends in the History of Technology,” The 
American Historical Review 95:3 (1990): 715-25, 716-17. 
11 A. T. Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on 
Land: Lectures Delivered at U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I., between the Years 1887 and 1911 (Boston MA: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1911); N. A. M. Rodger, “Weather, Geography and Naval Power in the Age of Sail,” The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 22 (1999): 178-200; Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (eds.), The British Navy and the 
Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988); John B. Hattendorf, Naval 
History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays (Malabar FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 2000). 
12 Barton C. Hacker, “The Symposium on the Social History of Military Technology: ICOHTEC 2006-2013,” Icon 20:1 
(2014): 74-83; Barton C. Hacker, “Introduction: Why the Social History of Military Technology,” Icon 14 (2008): 1-2. 
13 Hattendorf, Naval History, pp.267-74. 
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relocation, and had to depend on ‘reliable action at a distance’.14 Historians have examined how the 
deterioration of both crews’ bodies and technical instruments hampered scientific voyages, but the 
breakage and decay of the vessels conveying these expeditions have received less attention.15 As 
argued by Richard Sorrenson, ships themselves were in some senses part of the surveyor’s scientific 
instruments, essential to the task of exploration, and shaping its results.16 This meant that the very 
technological infrastructure of the Navy, carrying scientific personnel to the other side of the world, 
could also become one of their main problems: its failure obstructed expeditions in terminal ways, 
even more than human factors, broken timekeepers, or illness. Looking at these points of 
insufficiency and failure, in what is in general a story of might and success, highlights some ways in 
which technology can function as a pivot around which power is not only made – the angle from 
which the technology-power relationship is usually considered –,17 but also scrambled. When they 
have to be transported, some technologies become especially fragile, and this includes technologies 
of transportation themselves. In this sense, this paper offers a contribution to a growing body of 
studies stressing the ‘paradoxical’ nature of infrastructures: built for growth, they ‘deteriorate’; 
meant to be ‘solid’, they are in perpetual and intrinsic need to be ‘retrofitted’ and ‘refurbished’; and 
they ‘both mitigate and magnify precarity’.18 
 
14 Simon Naylor and Simon Schaffer, “Nineteenth-Century Survey Sciences: Enterprises, Expeditions and Exhibitions,” 
Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science 73:2 (2019): 135-47, esp. 139-40. 
15 See e.g., on health issues: Glyn Williams, “Scurvy on the Pacific Voyages in the Age of Cook,” Journal for Maritime 
Research 15:1 (2013): 37-45; Christopher Lawrence, “Disciplining Disease: Scurvy, the Navy, and Imperial Expansion, 
1750-1825,” in David Philip Miller and Peter Hanns Reill (eds.), Visions of Empire: Voyages, Botany, and 
Representations of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.80-106. On instrument fragility: Alexi 
Baker, “‘Precision’, ‘Perfection’, and the Reality of British Scientific Instruments on the Move During the 18 th 
Century,” Material Culture Review 74-75 (2012): 14-29; Charles W. J. Withers, “Geography and ‘Thing Knowledge’: 
Instrument Epistemology, Failure, and Narratives of 19th‐Century Exploration,” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 44 (2019): 676-91; Simon Schaffer, “Easily Cracked: Scientific Instruments in States of Disrepair,” Isis 
102:4 (2011): 706-17, 709-11; Eóin Phillips, “Instrumenting Order: Longitude, Seamen and Astronomers, 1770-1805,” 
in Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers (eds.), Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration 
(London: Routledge, 2015), pp.37-55, 45-6. 
16 Richard Sorrenson, “The Ship as a Scientific Instrument in the Eighteenth Century,” Osiris 11 (1996): 221-36. 
17 See e.g. Daniel Sarewitz, “Technology and Power,” in Stig Andur Pedersen et al. (eds.), A Companion to the 
Philosophy of Technology (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp.344-6. 
18 Cymene Howe et al., “Paradoxical Infrastructures: Ruins, Retrofit, and Risk,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 
41:3 (2016): 547-65. 
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After a brief overview of some of the material challenges faced by eighteenth-century Royal 
Navy vessels in general, I discuss how technology, often defective from the start, interfered with the 
Navy’s role as an instrument of imperial exploration and appropriation. Matthew Flinders’s voyages 
around Australia, finally, offer an example of how the ‘mortification’ of some commanders at their 
vessels’ unfitness for service even became embedded in imperial cartography. 
 
Repair challenges and the Navy overseas 
An eighteenth-century naval ship-of-the-line was one of the biggest and most 
technologically advanced manufactured objects of its time.19 A 74-gun third-rate carried almost 
thirty miles of line, and was made with timber equivalent to about 67 acres of forest.20 By the last 
wars of the period it measured 170 to 182 feet in length at the gundeck, about 47 to 49 in width, and 
had a depth of 19 to 21 feet in the hold.21 This is the equivalent of more than twenty train carriages 
stacked together.22 The mainmast towered 36 yards above,23 like a 10-storey building. Even smaller 
sloops, like those used in journeys of exploration around the world, measured 91 to 113 feet in 
length and 27 to 35 at the beam, a size comparable to that of a Boeing 737-100 tilted to one side.24 
The size of these vessels ensured that they weathered the open seas, but it multiplied their 
maintenance needs, especially given that they could be deployed away from Britain for many years 
at a time. By the final year of any war in the second half of the ‘long eighteenth century’, a Navy 
ship stationed abroad would have been absent from home for a mean of 641 days (about one year 
 
19 John A. Tilley, The British Navy and the American Revolution (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 
1987), p.xv. 
20 MacDougall, Royal Dockyards, pp.13, 97. 
21 Lavery, Ship of the Line, pp.184-5, 208. 
22 A Class 466 British regional train carriage measures 20.80mx2.80m (and about 4m in height): “Class 466 – South 
Eastern,” Angel Trains <https://www.angeltrains.co.uk/Products-Services/Regional-Passenger-Trains/24>.  
23 Lavery, Ship of the Line, p.208. 
24 Randolph Cock, “Precursors of Cook: The Voyages of the Dolphin, 1764-8,” The Mariner’s Mirror 85:1 (1999): 30-
52, 47; Rif Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1714–1792: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates 
(Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2007), p.1826; Peter Goodwin, Nelson’s Arctic Voyage: The Royal Navy’s First Polar 
Expedition 1773 (London: Adlard Coles, 2019), p.42; 737 Airplane Characteristics for Airport Planning (Boeing 
Commercial Airplanes, 2013), pp.28, 42 <http://www.boeing.com/assets/pdf/commercial/airports/acaps/737.pdf>. 
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and nine months), a median of 451 (one year and three months) and a staggering maximum of 3253 
days (almost nine years).25 As for voyages of ‘exploration’, the mean duration of a round trip was 
1009 days, and the median 942.26 Of course, time away per se does not mean much, as bases, or 
even allied ports, were available in many parts of the world. However, they did not always suffice. 
All Navy ships carried a carpenter, a sailmaker, a boatswain (who took care of the rigging as 
well as discipline), a caulker, a ropemaker, and various teams working under their orders – 
‘carpenter’s crew’, ‘sailmaker’s crew’, etc..27 These specialized artisans were tasked with the small 
daily repairs, and also intervened when weather, battle, or wear and tear caused more extensive 
damage, and dockyards were out of range.28 They excelled at making the most of broken parts or 
any locally-available resources, yet restoring a vessel to routine operativity was often impossible 
without spare components. Raw construction materials were frequently imported through a delicate 
supply network.29 Moreover, British metropolitan shipyards were then developing industrial 
procedures that, some have controversially argued, anticipated the civilian sector by several 
decades.30 The products of such advanced processes could not always be easily replicated in 
subsidiary facilities. As a result, even in some British bases – let alone away from them – ‘shortage 
of stores was the norm, rather than the exception’.31 
 
25 I collected this data using the Admiralty Ship List Books for February 1763, September 1783, March 1802 (the final 
months of the first three conflicts, respectively), and July 1813 (the last month of the Napoleonic Wars for which List 
Books survive): The National Archives, Kew, ADM 8/39, List Book, 1763; ADM 8/59, List Book, 1783; ADM 8/83, 
List Book, Jan.-Jun. 1802; ADM 8/100, List Book, 1812-1813. The records report the situation on the first day of each 
month. The stations covered are, varying slightly from war to war, Newfoundland, North America, Portugal, the 
Leeward Islands, Jamaica, South America, the Mediterranean, the Cape of Good Hope, and the East Indies, plus 
‘Convoys and Cruizers’ on general service. Excluded from the sample are vessels stationed in British or Irish waters or 
deployed in squadrons which bore no sailing date, as well as 285 others with missing, ambiguous, or clearly wrong 
dates (e.g. subsequent to the day of reckoning), or marked as built or commissioned overseas. The final database 
contained 572 vessels of all rates and types. When only the month and year of departure were given (1802 sample, 
occasionally), I uniformly picked the 15th day. 
26 This data refers to a total of 13 completed voyages between 1764 and 1795 (when vessels sailed together on an 
expedition I have counted each as a distinct journey only if they became separated). See the Appendix for details. 
27 Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815 new ed. (London and Mechanicsburg PA: 2004), pp.261-6. 
28 Coad, Royal Dockyards, p.305. 
29 James Davey, “Securing the Sinews of Sea Power: British Intervention in the Baltic 1780–1815,” The International 
History Review 33:2 (2011): 161-84. 
30 Carolyn C. Cooper, “The Portsmouth System of Manufacture,” Technology and Culture 25:2 (1984): 182-225. 
31 Crewe, Yellow Jack, pp.263-84, quote at p.271. 
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 Reliance on the port facilities of allied or neutral powers was also not straightforward. 
Although eighteenth-century European warships were a common transnational technology, political 
reasons might prevent mutual support. For example, the Order of St John of Jerusalem, which ruled 
Malta until 1799, strived for neutrality and non-assistance toward Christian powers at war with each 
other: from 1768, foreign warships allowed in the harbor of Valletta were capped at four.32 Lisbon 
was fundamental as a repair, refuge and resupply base for the British fleet throughout the century, 
but it was abruptly closed if the Portuguese government chose neutrality.33 Even where goodwill 
was not lacking, resources might be. Between 1798 and 1802, the British and Russian fleets were 
indispensable to the defence of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; as a result, once his arsenals 
were depleted, the Neapolitan King went as far as supplying the allies with spare parts scavenged 
from his own warships. These pieces, however, were insufficient and rotten.34 In short, even in 
Europe, reliance on other countries was an intrinsically precarious and uncertain way to operate, 
and the urgency of repairs could mean depending on ‘weaker’ allies. The material details of these 
encounters are key to integrating technological naval history into cultural, diplomatic and 
transnational history. 
 
Exploration and mortification 
 If geographical and technological displacement caused problems to any naval vessel, this 
was especially true of ‘discovery ships’, whether warships by build or repurposed merchantmen. 
Nearly all exploration voyages sponsored by the Royal Navy in the second half of the eighteenth 
century met with considerable infrastructural issues, forcing the commanders to rely on their crews’ 
 
32 Desmond Gregory, Malta, Britain, and the European Powers, 1793-1815 (Cranbury NJ: Associated University 
Presses, 1996), pp.40-1. 
33 Baugh, British Naval Administration, p.342; Martin Robson, Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic 
Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp.36-40, 
147-51, 162-95. 




carpentering and manufacturing skills, or on the assistance of authorities in remote settlements of 
other European powers.  
After his expedition in the north-western Pacific, Captain George Vancouver extolled the 
‘friendly and hospitable reception’ of the Spanish in California: this included free supplies and, 
when his own armourer ran away, in January 1793, the very generous loan of the only trained smith 
in the Monterrey establishment, which solved an otherwise significant material problem. As 
Vancouver wrote, an armourer ‘was an artificer of too much importance, to persons in our situation, 
to be hastily declined’.35 During his journey in HMS Dolphin, in 1764, Commodore John Byron 
had to stop at Rio de Janeiro for substantial refits. He hired six Portuguese caulkers, and the officer 
who later published an account of the expedition was fairly disparaging of their industry and of their 
country’s resources, but not of their workmanship: ‘one of our English caulkers would do as much 
in one day,’ he wrote, ‘as they could in three; but though they are slow and inactive, they perform 
their work very completely, or else their vessels could not run so many voyages in a shattered 
condition as they frequently do’. Thousands of miles from the nearest British base, Byron had to 
make do with was available, and in fact the episode turned into an opportunity for a technological 
cultural encounter: the account observed that these men could fix even large seams making them ‘as 
hard as the plank itself, and yet they use not any moisture, as our English caulkers do, except what 
little proceeds from the constant application of the iron to their mouths’.36 Technological 
observation and ‘dissemination’ are only profitably studied at this sort of micro-level.37 
In any case, as Daniel Margócsy and Mary Brazelton discuss in the Introduction, the 
relocation of technologies of transportation can result in ‘conversations’ and knowledge exchange 
 
35 [George Vancouver], A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, and round the World, 3 vols (London: G. G. 
and J. Robinson and J. Edwards, 1798), II, pp.46, 99-101, 439. 
36 Anon., A Voyage round the World, in His Majesty’s Ship the Dolphin, Commanded by the Honourable Commodore 
Byron (London: J. Newbery and F. Newbery, 1767), pp.16-17. On this account see: Robert E. Gallagher (ed.), Byron’s 
Journal of His Circumnavigation, 1764-1766 (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp.lxxiii-vi. 
37 Liliane Hilaire-Pérez and Catherine Verna, “Dissemination of Technical Knowledge in the Middle Ages and the 
Early Modern Era: New Approaches and Methodological Issues,” Technology and Culture 47:3 (2006): 536-65. 
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between locals and newcomers, but also in ‘control’ issues.38 Byron warned ‘future navigators, 
particularly those of our own nation’, that the Portuguese at Rio habitually ‘enticed’ or tricked 
seamen away from the ships that stopped there to refit and resupply; the Portuguese pilot he hired 
also proved unreliable, and almost wrecked the Dolphin.39 The most trouble with foreign port 
authorities was perhaps had by Philip Carteret, as commander of HMS Swallow. When he arrived in 
Celebes in 1767, his ship and his men on their last legs, the Dutch East India Company received 
him with extreme suspicion and fears of commercial ‘intrusion’, refused him help at Macassar, and 
sent him over to Bonthain; the result was that he was easily dragged into local intrigues and 
convinced of an existing plot to seize his vessel.40 Later, in Batavia, after some diplomatic sparring 
about the previous incident, and complaints against Carteret’s ‘arrogance’, Dutch carpenters 
repaired his ship. The Swallow was in such bad state that they would have condemned it as 
unseaworthy, had he not rejected their opinion and taken full responsibility.41 
 In many cases, exploration vessels developed faults as a result of ongoing and exceptional 
strain. However, the issues were often there from the start. Captain William Robert Broughton of 
HMS Providence remarked in his account that the ship ‘was singly sheathed with copper’, but he 
reckoned ‘it would be proper, that all ships employed in distant voyages should be sheathed with 
wood, and coppered over the sheathing’.42 Without adequate coppering, the hulls of vessels fell 
prey of the inexorable shipworm teredo navalis, which proliferated in tropical latitudes.43 For one 
whole year, the Providence made 2-4 inches of water per hour. The leak was eventually repaired 
only in April 1796, when the ship’s carpenters were able to build a wharf in Nootka and heave 
 
38 See also Bronwen Everill’s article. 
39 Hawkesworth, Account, I, p.7. 
40 Helen Wallis (ed.), Carteret’s Voyage round the World 1766-1769, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1965), I, pp.76-93, 213-42; II, pp.365-414, 419-20. 
41 Ibid., I, pp.250-4; II, pp.414-37. 
42 William Robert Broughton, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 
1804), p.2. 
43 Randolph Cock, “‘The Finest Invention in the World’: The Royal Navy’s Early Trials of Copper Sheathing, 1708-
1770,” The Mariner’s Mirror 87:4 (2001): 446-59; Crewe, Yellow Jack, pp.213-15. 
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down the vessel.44 The Vancouver expedition of 1791-5 was in all respects very well equipped, and 
the Discovery was an excellent ship, but even in the initial passage from Spithead to Falmouth the 
Chatham armed tender accompanying it ‘proved so very crank, as, in some instances, to occasion 
considerable alarm’: its ‘crank situation and bad sailing’ caused delays and inconveniences 
throughout, making it lag behind the Discovery.45  
Most notorious of all is the case of Carteret’s HMS Swallow during its 1766-9 voyage. The 
officer complained that it was ‘an old Vessel… and one of the worst, if not the very worst of her 
kind; in his majesty’s Navy, and was in every respects, but indifferently fitted out’. Even before 
departure, he knew that it was not ready, and lacked essentials like a forge: it ‘was only supply’d 
with the common, but scanty necessaries, in the manner a Vessell of that kind might be, if bound on 
an Ordinary voyage, such as to the Mediterranean, & where in case of need, she could be assisted’. 
As he pointed out, this was inconceivable for ‘a voyage of discoveries, in the most distant, and 
dangerous part of the world; where no other helps could be procured, but those we should carry 
with us’. The situation of the Swallow made ‘common Navigations in Europe, where every Port is 
open to repair our damage’ (as he wrote somewhat hyperbolically) look comparatively safe. 
However, his requests for improvements had been refused by the Admiralty. Carteret may be a 
biased commentator, but the conditions of the Swallow did mean that the expedition repeatedly 
teetered on the brink of disaster, and to the end he bemoaned the fact that ‘such an old Vessell, that 
was known to have been a bad tool of a ship,… should be purposely picked for such distant Service, 
out of all the numerous navy of Great Britain, since there were so many better Ships, lying 
unemployed, & for want of use, rotting in the harbours of England’.46 Exploration vessels were not 
‘neutral’ means of transportation, to be taken for granted: they were ‘tools’, and indeed the most 
indispensable tool of all. Carteret also alerts us to the contradiction between naval and national 
 
44 Broughton, Voyage, pp.9, 32, 51-4. 
45 [Vancouver], Voyage, I, pp.xi, xv-xvi, 4, 6, 9-10; III, p.126.  
46 Wallis, Carteret’s Voyage, I, pp.20-8, 105-8, 111-15, 142-4; II, p.443. 
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might and broken ships, to which we shall return. Much of his rightful indignation was watered 
down in John Hawkesworth’s Admiralty-sponsored edition of his journal.47 This was an attempt to 
conceal the fact that, oftentimes, explorers were not simply fighting the mighty natural elements and 
the perils of the unknown, as the heroic narrative goes, but their own incompetently and negligently 
equipped vessels.  
 Regardless of anybody’s direct culpability, one common sentiment, almost a trope, recurs 
throughout voyage accounts, capturing the feelings of commanding officers upon discovering that 
their ships were defective or damaged. In July 1764, Byron had barely set sail, with the Dolphin and 
the Tamar, when he ‘had the mortification to find the Tamar a very heavy sailer’.48 Samuel Wallis 
set off in August 1766 with the Dolphin, Swallow, and Prince Frederick, but he ‘had soon the 
mortification to find that the Swallow was a very bad sailer’.49 In August 1776, again scarcely a 
month after departure, Cook had ‘the mortification to find our ship [HMS Resolution] exceedingly 
leaky in all her upper works. The hot and sultry weather… had opened her seams, which had been 
badly caulked at first, so wide, that they admitted the rain water through as it fell’: all the crew’s 
quarters were drenched and made uninhabitable, and the sails ‘damaged’.50 Vancouver had much 
frustration with masts. In June 1794 he ‘had the mortification to understand, that just as the 
carpenters employed on the bowsprit were about leaving off work, they had found it rotten nearly in 
the middle’; in March the following year, he ‘had the mortification to learn, that there was not a 
spar, either at Valparaiso, or in the country within our reach, of a size sufficient to be converted into 
a [main]mast, for the purpose of replacing our disabled one on board the Discovery’; and further 
‘mortification’ was caused by discovering that his mainmast was more damaged than he had 
reckoned, by understanding that the heel of the mast was rotten, even if not sprung like the head, 
and finally, once the mast was fixed, by the revelation that the mainyard was also largely rotten, and 
 
47 Ibid., II, p.473. 
48 Hawkesworth, Account, I, p.3. 
49 Ibid., I, p.364. 
50 James Cook and James King, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 3 vols (Dublin: E. Chamberlaine, 1784), I, p.33. 
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‘intirely unfit for service’.51 ‘This was a mortification I did not expect to have met with,’ he 
mourned,  
and as there was no possibility of procuring at this place a spar of sufficient size to replace 
it, the only means we had of repairing the defect was by making a temporary yard out of a 
spare maintopmast, with the addition of the yard arms of the yard which was decayed, and 
which I was extremely sorry to observe were by no means in a perfectly sound condition.52  
This ‘additional disaster’ put an early end to his expedition: ‘the regret’ he ‘felt in being thus 
compelled to abandon the examination of this almost unknown, yet interesting part of the coast, is 
not to be described’; but continuing would have been too dangerous.53 
Of course, published accounts are written for an audience, and the subtle public rhetoric of 
blame and self-defence needs to be taken into account. However, the language of mortification 
seems to capture an important element on the palette of emotions undergone by voyagers, and in 
particular their strong sense of ultimate material powerlessness. 
These feelings are routinely obscured in narratives that only emphasize the overcoming of 
obstacles and ‘success story’ of naval enterprise in the late eighteenth century. This is illustrated 
particularly well by one of the most celebrated British expeditions of the time, if we examine it 
from the point of view of naval technology. Because of its national and imperial significance and 
mythologization, Matthew Flinders’s mission to chart the Australian coastline is the perfect case 





51 [Vancouver], Voyage, III, pp.160, 406, 409, 410, 455. 
52 Ibid., III, p.455. 
53 Ibid., III, pp.455-6. 
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Matthew Flinders and his ships 
Between 1801 and 1803, by Admiralty orders, the Royal Navy commander and hydrographer 
Matthew Flinders sailed HM Sloop Investigator along the coasts of ‘New Holland’ (present-day 
Australia), where ‘His Majesty's colony of New South Wales’ was located, producing detailed 
charts [Figure 5].54 His expedition has been the object of an extensive literature, including 
biographical and narrative accounts, and work by historians of science and cartography.55 Little has 
been said, however, on what it reveals about the Navy and its technology.  
Flinders’s sloop was in poor condition and increasingly needing emergency ‘voyage 
repairs’, for which the crew could count on no one but themselves. In November 1802, in Torres 
Strait, it had been leaking up to 14 inches per hour; at the first suitable anchorage, on Sweers Island, 
the carpenters discovered two rotten planks, and ‘patched up the bad part’.56 This was not the end of 
the problems, as during their caulking they came across more and more damage: ‘report after 
report’, Flinders wrote, ‘was brought to me of rotten places found in different parts of the ship, – in 
the planks, bends, timbers, tree-nails, &c., until it became quite alarming.’57 The carpenter and the 
master concluded that the sloop could not survive a ‘strong gale’, getting aground or heaving down 
for careening: it was given a six-month prognosis in good weather, with the warning that ‘in twelve 
months there will scarcely be a sound timber in her’.58 Flinders was distraught: his goal had been to 
achieve the definitive charting of the Australian coastline, even taking the risk of navigation close to 
shore. ‘But with a ship incapable of encountering bad weather, – which could not be repaired if 
sustaining injury from any of the numerous shoals or rocks upon the coast, – which, if constant fine 
 
54 Matthew Flinders, A Voyage to Terra Australis, 2 vols and Atlas (London: G. and W. Nicol, 1814), I, p.8. 
55 See e.g.: J. K. Laughton and Andrew C. F. David, “Flinders, Matthew (1774–1814),” in ODNB (2011) 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9750>; Ernest Scott, The Life of Captain Matthew Flinders, R.N. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011 [1914]); Kenneth Morgan, Matthew Flinders, Maritime Explorer of Australia 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); id., “Matthew Flinders and the Charting of Australia’s Coasts, 1798-1814,” 
Terrae Incognitae 50:2 (2018): 115-45; Eóin Phillips, “Remembering Matthew Flinders,” Journal for Maritime 
Research 14:2 (2012): 111-19; Dany Bréelle, “Matthew Flinders’s Australian Toponymy and Its British Connections,” 
The Journal of the Hakluyt Society (November 2013). 
56 Flinders, Voyage, II, pp.135-6. 
57 Ibid., II, p.141. 
58 Ibid., II, pp.141-3. 
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weather could be ensured and all accidents avoided, could not run more than six months; – with 
such a ship, I knew not how to accomplish the task.’59 In March 1803 he abandoned the close 
survey to return to Port Jackson, a long and troubled journey.60 There, on 14 June, the master 
builder and other officers, after a quick examination, decreed that the Investigator was ‘not worth 
repairing in any country, and that it is impossible in this country to put her in a state fit for going to 
sea’.61 Provisionally patched up, the sloop was subsequently put to use in the colony, and eventually 
undertook a very precarious return voyage to England in 1805; it was only there that, after being 
sold into the merchant service, it could undergo proper refitting, and had a further long career, 
terminating as late as 1872.62  
 
 
59 Ibid., II, p.143. 
60 Ibid., II, pp.247-8. 
61 Ibid., II, pp.274-5. 




Figure 5: Flinders, Voyage, Atlas, Plate I. Source: “Encounter 1802-2002,” State Library of South 
Australia, B 1298521 <https://encounter.collections.slsa.sa.gov.au/collection/B12985211_92.htm>. 
 
As for Flinders, of the handful of ships available in that remote part of the world, none 
would have been a fit replacement without several months of makeshift, uncertain repairs, so he 
chose to head back to England aboard one of them, HMS Porpoise – which was wrecked on a 
reef.63 Miraculously returned to Port Jackson, he sailed again on the badly leaking HMS 
Cumberland: along the way the small Dutch settlement of Coepang offered no opportunity to repair 
the pumps, or pitch to seal the seams, so the ship was obliged to call at French-occupied Mauritius. 
The war with France had just recommenced; Flinders was imprisoned and stranded there for six and 
a half years.64  
 
63 Flinders, Voyage, II, pp.275-9. 
64 Ibid., II, pp.348-371, 485. 
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Distance from home ports and lack of resources had been the crucial factors provoking the 
demise of Flinders’s mission. The technological limitations of transporting technologies of 
transportation to the other side of the globe had both put an early end to the survey, and frustrated 
any hope of resuming it. Flinders’s struggles to keep afloat and continue with the allotted task – 
which ultimately did result in carefully-made, if incomplete, charts – can be seen as evidence of the 
professional quality and heroic resourcefulness of the Royal Navy, and of the long reach and 
stubborn expansionism of the British empire. In this vein they have been celebrated for centuries, in 
both British and Australian memorialization.65 A bronze statue of Flinders, bent over his charts in 
an elegantly classical pose, in the very act of empire-building, has stood in the middle and later at 
the entrance of Euston Station, in London, since the bicentenary of his death in July 2014 [Figure 
6].66 Yet these struggles for survival can also tell a parallel story of weakness, compromise and 
disempowerment in the face of natural elements and constrained resources, and nowhere is this 
more apparent, to a cultural historian of naval technology, than in Flinders’s very charts. 
 
 
65 Morgan, Flinders, pp.199-200. 
66 “The Matthew Flinders Memorial Statue,” Mark Richards, <http://www.markrichards.eu/matthew-flinders>; 
“Memorial Statue,” Flinders Memorial, <http://www.flindersmemorial.org/the-matthew-flinders-memorial-statue/>. 




Figure 6: Matthew Flinders Memorial Statue at Euston Station (photograph by Sara Caputo). 
 
At first sight, these charts, commissioned by the British Admiralty, are themselves an 
embodiment of the national imperialistic myth. Eighteenth-century maritime science oscillated 
between cosmopolitan international collaboration and, by 1800, growing nationalisms.67 
Hydrography in particular had crucial military, economic, and imperial significance, inextricably 
embedding the surveyors’ work within wider structures of power.68 ‘Accuracy’ itself can be a 
‘talisman of authority’.69 Whatever the carefulness and apparent scientific objectivity with which 
they are traced, maps, as a ‘form of knowledge’, cannot escape the influence of cultural biases and 
 
67 François Bellec, “La cartographie de l’Australie: compétition et coopération outre mer (XVIIIe-XIXe siècles),” 
Australian Journal of French Studies 41:2 (2004): 33-42; Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in 
Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694-1790 (Notre Dame 
IN and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp.25-46, 132-5; John Gascoigne, Science in the Service of 
Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses of Science in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), esp. ch.6. 
68 J. B. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (eds.), The Iconography of 
Landscape: Essays in the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), pp.277-312, esp. 282-3; Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Harlow: Longman, 1980), pp.74-5; Bréelle, “Australian Toponymy,” 17. 
69 Harley, “Maps,” pp.299-300; Naylor and Schaffer, “Nineteenth-Century Survey Sciences,” 142-3. 
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mechanisms of power, as critical cartography has shown.70 Whilst Flinders mostly avoided openly 
patriotic themes, in his choice of toponyms for ‘newly discovered’ places, he paid tribute to several 
British personalities, most notably the three First Lords of the Admiralty, Spencer, St Vincent, and 
Yorke, who were his patrons (and, in St Vincent’s case, national heroes); friends and shipmates 
featured, together with labels like ‘Point Dover’ for a white cliff. 71 He also preferred ‘Terra 
Australis’, or ‘Australia’, as general name for the continent, because it prevented ‘New South 
Wales’ from becoming part of ‘New Holland’.72 Labelling and measuring a territory, and 
positioning it in relation to Greenwich, are plain forms of appropriation.73 However, paying more 
attention to the specific technological features embedded in Flinders’s charts reveals a stark 
counter-narrative.  
Like many contemporary explorers and cartographers, Flinders meticulously marked the 
Investigator’s track, with relative dates.74 His charts are dynamic, expressing movement next to 
fixed geographical features, ‘wayfinding’ next to ‘map-making’.75 Choosing to record an individual 
journey, beside universal and supposedly unchanging features, is in itself an epistemological 
declaration, a scientist’s way of turning a chart into a falsifiable, provisional, case-specific theory, 
rather than an impartial statement. Tracks on eighteenth-century charts act as the concrete 
manifestation of the ship’s role as a surveying instrument.76 
 
70 Harley, “Maps,” pp.279-82, 300-3; Les Roberts, “Mapping Cultures: A Spatial Anthropology,” in id. (ed.), Mapping 
Cultures: Place, Practice, Performance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.1-25, 12-13; Rob Kitchin, Martin 
Dodge and Chris Perkins, “Introductory Essay: Power and Politics of Mapping,” in iid. (eds.), The Map Reader: 
Theories of Mapping Practice and Cartographic Representation (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp.388-94; 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p.69. 
71 Flinders, Voyage, Atlas, Plate I, c.32° S, 125° E; Bréelle, “Australian Toponymy,” 13, 18; Scott, Life, pp.209-14, 
465-74; on the hegemonic significance of place-naming see: Jan Tent and Helen Slatyer, “Naming Places on the 
‘Southland’: European Place-Naming Practices from 1606 to 1803,” Australian Historical Studies 40 (2009): 5-31, 9-
10, 15. 
72 Royal Greenwich Observatory Archives (Board of Longitude project, University of Cambridge), RGO, 14/51, Papers 
on the Tides and Trade Winds, 1780s-1820s, ff.171-3, Matthew Flinders to Joseph Banks, 23 August 1804. 
73 Harley, “Maps,” pp.282-3, 289-90; Tent and Slatyer, “Naming Places,” 9. 
74 Flinders, Voyage, I, pp.v-vi; on Flinders’s methods see: M. K. Barritt, “Matthew Flinders’s Survey Practices and 
Records,” The Journal of the Hakluyt Society (March 2014), 1-15; Morgan, “Matthew Flinders”. 
75 On this concept see: Roberts, “Mapping Cultures,” p.17. 
76 Sorrenson, “Ship as a Scientific Instrument,” 228-36. 
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 Indeed, this narrative, temporal aspect of the charts makes the ship itself visible, and 
contains a story hidden to a superficial glance. The graphic record allows us to calculate the speed 
of navigation, seldom reported in Flinders’s published journals. For instance, between 24 and 27 
May 1803, just before its arrival in Port Jackson, the Investigator covered 395 nautical miles, hence 
doing an average 5.49 knots [Figure 7].77 This is a respectable speed, for a ship of the time, 
especially ‘collier-built’ and ‘deeply laden’.78 Not necessarily so, however, if sailing with a wind 
like the one marked on the chart, predominantly a ‘fresh breeze’ (fourth degree on a scale of seven, 
or a 5 on the Beaufort scale), coming from one of the best angles – the vessel is ‘on broad reach’, in 
technical terms.79 The sloop was then rather far from the coast, it had ceased to take any 
measurements which would have slowed its pace, and in fact Flinders was making all the sail he 
could to return to Port Jackson as fast as possible, and avoid further casualties among his severely 
sick crew.80 Therefore, we can consider this measurement an accurate gauge of the capabilities of 
the Investigator: it was, by then, making water at the rate of 5 inches an hour, and would have sunk 
if the wind had come from either the larboard side or the larboard or starboard quarters, pushing 
below the waterline the most rotten parts of its hulk.81 Similar calculations could of course be 
performed throughout the Atlas, and cast some more light on the British Admiralty’s priorities, 
resources, and commitment to scientific explorations: Britain possessed the largest fleet on the 
globe (285 vessels in 1800), and yet – familiar refrain – ‘no better ship could be spared’.82 The truth 
 
77 Measured with a ruler, the distance is 4.84 inches. The chart is on a scale of 0.5 inches to the degree of longitude. The 
value of longitude degrees varies with the latitude. Being this a Mercator projection, however, 1’ latitude equals 1 
nautical mile, so distances can be calculated reporting the value in inches onto the latitude scale. We obtain 6° 35’, 
which then gives 6x60+35=395 nm in three days, that is, 5.49 nm per hour (a knot equals 1 nm/h). For this method see: 
Mark Monmonier, Rhumb Lines and Map Wars: A Social History of the Mercator Projection (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), p.81.  
78 Flinders, Voyage, I, p.46. 
79 See: Howard I. Chapelle, The Search for Speed under Sail 1700-1855 (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp.25-31. 
Naturally, lacking the Investigator’s exact hourly speed, which, together with construction and waterline details, would 
allow to establish its ‘speed-length ratio’, a shipbuilder would consider this a vague assessment, but it seems sufficient 
for our purposes here. For the Beaufort equivalents of eighteenth-century terminology see: R García-Herrera et al., 
CLIWOC Multilingual Meteorological Dictionary, An English-Spanish-Dutch-French Dictionary of Wind Force Terms 
Used by Mariners from 1750-1850 (De Bilt: Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut, 2003), esp. pp.14, 35. 
80 Flinders, Voyage, II, p.271. 
81 Ibid., II, p.275. 
82 Ibid., I, p.28; on Royal Navy numbers see: N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean – A Naval History of 
Britain 1649-1815 (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p.608. 
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is that the Investigator had started leaking, to Flinders’s ‘mortification’, as soon as it left England.83 
Through the slow, limping black track of the sloop, the deficiencies of his patrons are thus engraved 
into the chart, which consequently tells, next to the grand narrative of British power impressing 
commuters at Euston, a more subversive story subtly undermining it. 
 
 
Figure 7: Detail of the route of HMS Investigator. From Flinders, Voyage, Atlas, Plate I. Cropped 




The eighteenth-century British Navy was unquestionably a successful tool of global power. 
However, any flat narrative of its achievements, now firmly embedded in national mythology, 
obscures the limitations of such power. Many of these limitations stemmed directly from the 
 
83 Flinders, Voyage, I, pp.19, 21. 
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‘paradoxical’ quality of infrastructures:84 the very technology that permitted naval operations in 
distant seas could, when it ceased to function, become the weakest link in the chain. 
 Navy ships would be away from British shores for years at a time, regardless of their build 
or the availability of local resources. Especially away from British bases, men-of-war were forced 
to rely on the often precarious, whimsical, or limited help of foreign ports. Royal Navy vessels were 
not and could not be fully self-sufficient or self-reliant, because complex technologies and 
infrastructures rarely are. This fact is strikingly embedded in some of the most celebrated feats of 
naval expansion, hidden beneath the layers of human heroism which have been emphasized instead. 
The points where British naval power found itself overstretched, and figuratively and 
literally ‘out of its comfort zone’, afford examples of bravery and resourcefulness to those who set 
out to build national pantheons, important considerations to the naval strategist, but also a different 
type of insights. On the backdrop of glorious victories and worldwide domination, material fragility, 
displacement, inadequacy and dependence also featured, and they help us to tell an alternative, or 
rather complementary, history of the eighteenth-century British Navy. The interplay between travel 
distance and the relative brittleness of naval technology can be profitably studied by historians 
interested in technological transfer, cultural interactions, and transnational contacts. The material 
difficulties of the sailing Navy thus allow us to reintegrate it into maritime history and the history of 
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Appendix: Principal British naval journeys of discovery, 1764-180385 
Voyage Dates Duration 
John Byron – HMS Dolphin  3 July 1764 
(Plymouth) 
 
9 May 1766 
(Downs) 
675 
Patrick Mouat / James Cumming – 
HMS Tamar 
3 July 1764 
(Plymouth) 
 
23 July 1766 
750 
Samuel Wallis – HMS Dolphin 21 August 1766 
(Plymouth) 
 
20 May 1768 
(Downs) 
638 
Philip Carteret – HMS Swallow 21 August 1766 
(Plymouth) 
 
20 March 1769 
(Spithead) 
942 
James Cook – HMB Endeavour 25 August 1768 
(Plymouth) 
 
12 July 1771 
(Thames) 
1051 
James Cook – HMS Resolution 13 July 1772 
(Plymouth) 
 




85 Sources: Cock, “Precursors,” 31; Hawkesworth, Account, I, pp.3, 139, 364, 519, 526, 668; Wallis, Carteret’s Voyage, 
I, pp.31, 108; II, p.441; “Timeline of James Cook’s Voyages,” British Library <https://www.bl.uk/the-voyages-of-
captain-james-cook/timeline>; Beaglehole, Journals, p.477; RGO 14/56, Log Book of HMS Adventure; Goodwin, 
Nelson’s Arctic Voyage, pp.140, 258, 265; Cook and King, Voyage, I, p.39; Douglas Oliver, Return to Tahiti: Bligh's 
Second Breadfruit Voyage (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp.19, 257; [Vancouver], Voyage, I, p.4; III, 
pp.480, 489; Broughton, Voyage, p.5; Flinders, Voyage, I, p.17. Some dates are in nautical time and some in civil time, 
but because each journey’s departure and arrival dates come from the same source the duration ought to be unaffected. 
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Tobias Furneaux – HMS Adventure 13 July 1772 
(Plymouth) 
 
14 July 1774 
(Spithead) 
731 
Constantine John Phipps – HMS 
Racehorse and HMS Carcass 
4 June 1773 (Little 
Nore) 
 
29 September 1773 
(Deptford) 
117 
James Cook – HMS Resolution 12 July 1776 
(Plymouth) 
 
7 October 1780 
(Thames) 
1548 
Charles Clerke – HMS Discovery 1 August 1776 
(Plymouth) 
 
7 October 1780 
(Thames) 
1528 
William Bligh – HMS Providence 2 August 1791 
(Spithead) 
 
7 August 1793 
(Deptford) 
736 
George Vancouver – HMS Discovery  1 April 1791 
(Falmouth) 
 
13 September 1795 
(Shannon) 
1626 
William Robert Broughton / Peter 
Puget – HMS Chatham 
1 April 1791 
(Falmouth) 
 
17 October 1795 
1660 
William Robert Broughton – HMS 
Providence 





Matthew Flinders – HMS Investigator 18 July 1801 
(Spithead) 
 
DNR (as such) 
N.A. 
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